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534 TIFFANY V. SHORT [22 C.2d 
with this general rule. That was an action for an account-
ing ina JOInt venture. The trial court found that the de-
fendant by the terms of the agreement was to furnish the 
capital necessary to make all purchases of stock and materials 
and that it was not entitled to a refund of the money. spen~ 
for tha~ purpose. On appeal the judgment was reversed. ,The 
reviewing court concluded from the terms of the agreement 
and the statements rendered in the previous four and one-half 
years' business that the funds were to be considered as .an 
advance, and that therefore the defendant was to receive 
credit and be reimbursed for such expenditures. Since the 
amount remaining was insuffiCient to reimburse the defendant, ' 
plaintiff recovered not!J.ing. In the present case there was no 
'specific agreement as to division of assets upon dissolution. 
Therefore a division and distribution into equal parts before 
the return of capital, all of which had peen advanced by one 
partner, would 'be improper. None of the manufacturedde~ 
vices had been distributed by the partnership. There had 
been no sales. It is clear from the terms of the agreement that 
the . funds furnished' by defendant Short' were in the nature 
of advances, since they were to be furnished by him 'I until 
such time as the revenues and net income from the above-
.mentioned enterprises shall suffice to make further invest-
ment unnecessary~" On dissolution the profits could be meas-
ured only after Short had been reimbursed. There was no 
agreement to the contrary and his advancements were there-
fore a debt of the firm. 
The judgment should be and it is hereby modified to pro-
vide that, in lieu of the present provision relating to money 
judgment and division of proceeds from the sale of assets, 
the defendant George A. Short is entitled to the sum of 
$553.96 as against the plaintiff Tiffany; that the receiver shall 
proceed to sell the assets of the partnership and apply the 
proceeds first to the payment of the sum of $1,506.04 to the 
defendant Short, and that any remaining proceeds be dis-. 
tributed one-third to each of. the parties, the one-third share 
of the plaintiff to be applied on the judgment of $553.96 in 
favor of the defendant Short until such judgment is satisfied. 
As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, 
J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
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[L. A. No. 18633. In Bank. July 15, 1943.] 
WILLIAM J. FRIEDMAN et aI., Respondents, v. THOMAS 
M. BERGIN et aI., Appellants. . 
[ll Frauds.-Statuteof-:-Agreements Not·· to B~p,erfonried 
WIthin a Year.-A contract for sale of, concessIons at .!". rac-
ing track is within the statute of frauds, where such, contract, 
is to be performed over a period of .five years .. , " • ,:' ' 
[2] Contracts.-Actions.-Findings.-In, anac~ion,for;breaclt. of 
contract for sale of, concessions at a racin~ tracki,a findmg 
that. the only agreement between,t~epartteswlts.,that,of"a 
certain date necessarily implied~hat t!t8 te;rms ~f theaet~~l 
'arrangement under 'which the· concessIon was operatec} were, 
agreed upon at that time and were intended to/be.a part of-the 
contract then made. . . '.' . , 
[3] . Frauds,Statllte of-Memorandum:.....R~quisite~St~~men~_of 
Material Terms. of Agreement.:.....~racttcal const~ctton c~nnot 
supply material terms which should h3.ve been mcluded m an 
agreement because of the statute of frauds... . 
[4] Id. . ..,..Agreements Not to Be Performed Wit~ina Year"-oral 
Modification of Contract.:.....A. parol promIse, Performab,le 
over a -_ five-ye!lr period, .. ' is within -the. statute of . frauds, 
whether or not it is a' modification of another contract. 
[5] Id.":"'Agreements Not t9 B,e i»erfQrmed Within "Year-
Leases.-tike other contracts, a leasehold contract must com-
ply with the statute of fra~ds. 
APPEAL from a judgment of· the Super.ior. Court o~Los 
Angeles County and from an order m,odlfymg the Judg-
ment; John Beardsley, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for breach of contract. Judgment for plaintiffs 
reversed. 
Mott & Grant, Kenneth E. Grant and Harry C. Cogen 
for Appellants. 
Desser & Rau for Respondents. 
'. [1] See 12 Cal.Jur. 856, 901; 25 R.C.L. 452. '._ 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1]. Frauds-Statute. of, §7, [2] Con 
k 28' 8' [3] Frauds Statute of, § 39;, [4] Frauds. Statute of. tracts, l!, , 
I § 5; [5] Frauds, Statute of, § 1~ 
I .,>t: 
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TRAYNOR, J.-In a contract executed April 4, 1937, the 
Del Mar Turf Club granted defendant Thomas Bergin the 
right to dispense all food, liquors, soft drinks, cigars, cigar-
ettes, and other commodities, and to operate a cafe for em-
ployees, at a race track at the San Diego County Fair 
Grounds, at Del Mar, California. On April 24, 1937, Bergin 
signed an instrument reading as follows: "Received of 
William J. Friedman and Alex Charles Goodman, the sum 
of two thousand dollars ($2,000) in consideration for the 
following concessions at the Del Mar Turf Club: Oigarettes, 
cigars, candy, checking, including all lavortories (sic); for 
the term of five years commencing with the 1937 season and 
ending with the season for the year 1941. This agreement 
is to be followed by a formal contract on the same basis as 
that between the Del Mar Turf Club and the undersigned 
concessionaire." A formal contract was twice tendered plain-
tiffs Goodman and Friedman, but according to their testi-
mony they rejected it because it contained no clauses cover-
ing their understanding that they. were to receive an option 
to renew for five years, and that Bergin would return the 
$2,000 to plaintiffs if racing were discontinued during the 
term of the contract. Although no formal contract was exe-
cuted, plaintiffs operated the concession at the track for 
three years, making a profit of $4,198.61. The greater part of 
plaintiffs' sales were made in stands built by Bergin in the 
grandstand, and operated by Bergin's employees. Plaintiffs' 
sole function in connection with these stands was to provide 
the ~oods that were sold there. Bergin accounted to plain-
tiffs each night for the sales of such goods, and paid the 
proceeds to plaintiffs, less 16 2/3% of the candy sales, which 
he retained, and 3% of plaintiffs' total sales to cover the 
sales tax. Plaintiffs' sales in other parts of the track were 
made by girls who circulated through the crowd. Plaintiffs 
relied on Bergin to make all necessary arrangements for re-
tail licenses, social security and unemployment insurance 
payments, industrial accident insurance, and sales tax. 
During part of this period, Bergin acted through the Del 
Mar Caterers, to whom he had assigned his general conces-
sion from the Del Mar Turf Club. On April 24, 1940, the 
Del Mar Caterers assigned this concession to defendants An-
derson and Van Steen, informing plaintiffs accordingly. An-
derson and Van Steen were unwilling to continue the previ .. 
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ous arrangement but offered to use their own employeett 
and stands for the sale of plaintiffs' goods in return for 
50% of plaintiffs' net profits. Plaintiffs acquiesced, and, 
through agents, commenced operating the concession. Ander-
son and Van Steen, however, not only refused to give nightly 
accountings but insisted that plaintiffs be responsible for 
thelr own licenses, social security and unemployment insur-
ance payments, industrial accident insurance, and sales tax. 
After two or three days plaintiffs discontinued operations. 
Judgment was given in their favor in an action for breach 
of contract and defendants appeal. The defendant Anderson 
died during the pendency of the action and his executrix, 
Beulah Anderson, was substituted as defendant. After pro-
ceedings for new trial, the judgment was modified in certain 
particulars not here material. Subsequently, by stipulation 
of the parties, an order nunc pro tunc as of the date of 
entry of judgment was made striking from the judgment 
the name of defendant Del Mar Caterers, who by clerical 
error had been included therein. 
[1] The contract that plaintiffs seek to enforce was to 
be performed over a period of five years and is within the 
statute of frauds. (Civ. Code sec. 1624 (1).) Therefore, only 
if the instrument executed on April 24 contains the ma-
terial terms of the contract may plaintiffs recover. (Fritz v. 
Mills, 170 Cal. 449 [150 P. 375] ; Zellner v. Wassman, 184 
Cal. 80 [193 P. 84] ; see 12 Cal.Jur. 901; Restatement, Con-
tracts, sec. 207; 2 Williston on Contracts, (1936) p. 1618.) 
[2] The trial court found that the only agreement be-
tween plaintiffs and Bergin was that of April 24, 1937. That 
finding necessarily implies that the terms of the actual ar-
rangement under which the concession was operated were 
agreed upon at that time and were intended to be a part of 
the contract then made. [3] Although plaintiffs and Bergin 
may have agreed to tliese terms when they signed the memor-
andum, they did not include them therein. The memorandum 
does not state that plaintiffs were to have the right to sell 
their wares. through Bergin's stands and Bergin's employees, 
that plaintiffs were to receive. nightly accountings,· or that 
Bergin was to pay plaintiffs' licenses, social security and 
unemployment insurance payments, industrial accident -in-
su.rance and sales tax. There is no mention in its two sen-
tences of Bergin's right to retain 16 2/3% of plaintiffs' re~ 
ii 
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ceipts from candy sales. The actual operation of the conces-
sion involved the practical construction, not of the terms 
of the memorandum, but of material terms not expressed 
within it. (See Niles v. Hancock, 140 Cal. 157 [73 P. 8401 ; 
Edgar Bros . .co. v. Schmeiser Mfg. 00" 33 Cal.App. 667 
[166 P. 366]; Wineburgh v. Gay, 27 Cal.App. 603 [150 P. 
1003]; Dillingham v. Dahlgren, 52 Cal.App. 322 [198 p, 
832] ; Enlow v. Irwin, 80 Cal.App. 98 [251 P. 658] ; Santoro 
v. ltlack, 108 Conn. 683 [145 A. 273]; 2 Williston on Con-
tracts, (1936) p. 1645.) 
No contention is made that the reference to the contract 
between Bergin and the Del Mar Turf Club was intended 
to amplify the memorandum through the incorporation of 
that contract. The contract contained a clause requiring 
Bergin to erect his own facilities. A like clause in a contract 
between Bergin and plaintiffs would have required plaintiffs 
to erect the facilities; yet the only breach found by the trial 
court was that plaintiffs, were denied the use of stands erected 
by Bergin, The Del Mar Turf Club had the right to termin-
a~e Ber~in 's contract. if a named officer of the club regarded 
hIS serVIces as unsatISfactory. Bergin was required to post 
$5000 as bond for performance, to pay his own sales tax and 
to comply with all laws, presumably including Workmen's 
Compensation and Social Security Laws, Plaintiffs however 
relied upon Bergin to pay such costs as taxes, lic~nses, and 
workmen's compensation and social security insurance. They 
were never asked to post bond, and there is no indication 
that an~ belief that their services were unsatisfactory would 
be suffiCIent grounds to permit Bergin to terminate the con-
tract. The reference to the Del Mar contract suggests only 
that it was to be a model in form for the formal contract to 
be executed, and affords no clue as to how far the parties 
proposed to copy the Del Mar contract. 
[4] Plaintiffs explain the absence from the memorandum 
of the terms of the arrangement under which they operated 
on t~e ~ound that those terms were the result, of a parol 
modlficat~on of the contract; They testified that in July, at 
the opemng of the 1937 racing season, Bergin told them 
that they could not erect their own stands, but must work 
through his. Plaintiffs testified that Bergin also told them 
that he would be responsible for such costs as taxes licenses 
and workmen's compensation and social security i~surance' 
They therefore 'contend that the- memorandum was a com-
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plete statement of the contract before its modification. Since 
the only breach found, however, was the denial of plaintiffs' 
right to use the stands erected by Bergin, plaintiffs must rely 
upon the modifications in order to recover. These modifica-
tions were not made in writing, and a parol promise, per-
formable over a five-year period, is within the statute of 
frauds whether or not it is a modification of another con-
tract. (See Twohey v.Realty Syndicate 00.,4 Ca1.2d379 [49 
P.2d 819]; Notes, 118 A.L,R. 1511; 29 A.L.R. 1095; 17 
A.L.R. 10; 9 Wigmore on Evidence, (1940) p. 177.) 
[5] Plaintiffs also contend that a concession contract is 
like a lease,and rely on Beckett v. Oity of Paris Dry Goods 
00., 14 Ca1.2d 633 [96 P.2d 122], for the proposition that 
an insufficient description of the premises 'leased may be 
aided by parol evidence. Like other contracts,/ however, a 
leasehold contract must comply with the statute of frauds. 
(Wineburgh v. Gay, supra; Enlow v. Irwin, supra; Rohan 
v. Proctor, 61 Ca1.App. 447 [214 P. 986].) The opinion in , 
the Beckett case does not discuss the statute of fr,auds and 
shows that the court had before it a detailed written lease, 
involving no omissions comparable to those made in the 
Writing on which plaintiff relies. 
,The judgment and the order modifying judgment after 
proceedings on motion for new trial are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, 
J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
